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Abstract: The bargaining power of a country plays an influential and impactful role in 
trade negotiation. The final trade agreement is the result of the background negotiation 
among the contracting countries in a bilateral, regional or a multilateral arrangement. 
This paper has  attempted to explore main strategies often exercised by the countries in 
trade negotiation and identifying factors that, in one way or the other, determine the 
bargaining power, particularly, of the developing countries. The data gathered from 
secondary sources are qualitatively analyzed. As strategies, the principle of reciprocity 
(negotiation based on a ‘give and a take’ policy) and prior preparation (conducting 
the negotiation process with full prior information, research finding and analysis), 
have been identified. Furthermore, the basic factors for building or relinquishing 
bargaining power particularly from the developing country’s perspective have been 
discerned as market, commercial intelligence, capacity to control others and resource. 
As trade cooperation is becoming an unavoidable and inescapable phenomenon in the 
entire world, developing countries are advised to make themselves ready to play well 
the trade negotiation game by improving their bargaining power and byexploiting 
maximum possible out of that. There is no trade deal that is wholesale good or bad; 
it rather depends on how the country negotiates.    
Keywords: Bargaining power; Trade negotiation; Developing countries. 




Trade cooperation and integration through 
various modalities is becoming the current 
trend. However, managing successfully this 
complex and rapidly evolving mass of economic 
arrangements, alongside the global political 
tension and dynamics, requires thorough 
attention and comprehensive technical skills. 
UNCTAD (n.d) states that “understanding the 
changes occurring globally, the impact of trade 
in national development interests and priorities 
and fostering consensus on addressing trade 
barriers and commitment to more open and 
fairer international trade.” 
Trade negotiation is the process to set in 
advance rules that facilitate, guide and regulate 
trading among countries. In addition to the 
active participation of the negotiating countries, 
it invites direct or indirect involvement 
of the private sector and other interested 
groups. When countries come together for a 
certain trade deal, they stand for their own 
respective interests that most often contradict 
to each other. Trade negotiation is thus a very 
complex process which goes through a series 
of tradeoffs. Sometimes, the process takes 
decades together. The outcome of any trade 
negotiation depends on the relative strength 
of negotiating countries. Such strength of the 
countries is commonly referred to as bargaining 
power. Bargaining power of countries in trade 
negotiation can be interpreted and expressed 
in different ways. 
The objective of this paper is to explore 
and discuss main issues involved in a trade 
negotiation particularly from the perspective 
of developing countries. This piece comprises 
five sections. The first section is introductory, 
followed by the section for the definition of 
bargaining power in trade negotiation. The 
third section highlights steps of how trade 
negotiation should be conducted. Having 
done these, the main determinants of trade 
negotiation have  been  discussed under the 
fourth with developing countries in focus. 
Lastly, main points have been summarized as 
conclusion.  
Understanding Bargaining Power in 
Trade Negotiations 
The term ‘power’ has been understood in 
different ways with positive and negative 
undertones. The power of negotiating states 
in trade negotiation may be acquired from 
legitimate sources and applied in a fair manner. 
But the opposite is not also uncommon. Power 
is thus analyzed both theoretically based on the 
conception arguments’ reflect and its specific 
association and usage. Under this section, both 
views have been attempted.   
Basing on the neorealist approaches and 
different alternatives, international relations 
between states take place within a constant 
state of anarchy (McGlinchey, Walters & 
Scheinpflug, 2017). Each state tends to protect 
its national security as well as securing its 
survival by means of military and economic 
capabilities within this anarchy. In so doing, 
states try to accumulate as many military and 
economic resources as much possible (Bailer, 
2010). According to McGlinchey et al. (2017), 
this forms a basic ingredient of power in these 
relations as they dominate in  relations between 
states. Henceforth, the basic emphasis of this 
theory is thus on the attributes of the actor (the 
state) itself. Approaches of structural realism 
validate this by relating it to a theory of balance 
of power whereas such balance may be attained 
by arms races and by factors of “economic 
capabilities” and “military strength” as well 
as alliances (ibid). 
On the other hand, social constructivists 
emphasize the importance of the system in 
which the state interacts itself as a social process 
influences policy outcome. This process for 
example in the social environment generates 
identities; reputations; perceptions and ideas 
of the actors (Malik, 2013). Thus, international 
relations may not necessarily be influenced only 
by states’ material capabilities and structures 
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in which interactions take place. Ideas and 
the perceptions of the actors should not be 
ignored as they tend to play an important role. 
Henceforth, the ability to influence such ideas or 
creating and controlling such perceptions may 
form an ingredient of the power in international 
relations. How could such power be obtained 
and exercised? Ability to shape the opinions 
that other states have over these capabilities 
is crucial as well. According to Bailer (2010), 
controlling perceptions of the future capabilities 
of development are important in order to be 
in such a position. One way that developing 
countries may obtain such power would be 
to exercise practices that aim to create an 
image of them as important emerging markets 
(Drahos, 2003). A good example of this may be 
drawn from the summits of the BRICs. When 
a developing country enters into negotiation 
with a developed country, it tends to face 
the challenge of unequal bargaining power 
(ibid). However, even in a multilateral trade 
agreement, bargaining power still functions to 
favour developed countries, and developing 
countries do not always gain powers from 
numbers (Page, 2002). 
In Bailer (2010) statement, the term 
‘bargaining power’ means “the ability of 
a person, group, or organization to exert 
influence over another party in a negotiation 
in order to achieve a deal which is favorable to 
themselves.” In this sense, bargaining power 
refers to the relative capability of the parties to 
a negotiation that would  culminate in a binding 
deal. In other ways, it is a measure of the 
capacity of one negotiating party to influence 
another. Parties with higher bargaining power 
are able to leverage their circumstances to strike 
more desirable deals with others. The term 
‘bargaining power’ thus comes to the picture in 
any type of negotiation and between whatever 
entity of natural or  of artificial in character. 
Note that the parties in unilateral, bilateral, 
regional and multilateral negotiations are 
sovereign countries. For the purpose of this 
paper, ‘bargaining power in trade negotiation’ 
does mean the capacity of one country to 
dominate the other due to its influence, power, 
size, or status, or through a combination of 
different persuasion tactics. In other words, 
trade negotiation is a bargaining game between 
countries with competing objectives and 
bargaining power is the strength of one 
negotiating country to influence another 
negotiating country to obtain an advantage 
out of the final agreement. However, if both 
the parties are on an equal footing in the 
negotiation, they will have equal bargaining 
power which is known as perfectly competitive 
(Lundgren, Bailer, Tallberg & Tarlea, 2017).
For negotiations to succeed, each one of the 
negotiating countries must give up something 
in exchange for reciprocal concessions of equal 
or more value from the other negotiating 
country. If countries on both the sides of the 
negotiation just focus on their own respective 
needs and interests irrespective of the needs 
and interests of countries on the other side 
of the negotiation, it is highly improbable to 
come to consensus though there are countries 
in the negotiation with huge bargaining power. 
However, the undeniable fact is that the more a 
country has a bargaining power, the more likely 
it can influence other negotiating countries for 
its own benefit, and the vice versa.  
The factors that determine the level 
of countries` bargaining power in trade 
negotiations are different depending on the 
stage of the negotiation, the subject matter of the 
negotiation, the existing domestic affair of the 
negotiating country and the prevailing global 
economic and political landscape. A country 
which has a good bargaining power today 
may not have the same power tomorrow or a 
country with a significant bargaining power 
with respect to a certain good or service may 
have insignificant bargaining power in a trade 
negotiation for some other goods or services at 
the same time. Furthermore, bargaining power 
is measured on a comparative basis, i.e., by 
comparing the strength of  one country with 
that of the other. Because of these, the existence 
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of high or low bargaining power is not per se 
visible during negotiation. It rather requires 
some comprehensive comparative investigation 
and analysis regarding potential of all the 
negotiating countries and the international 
environment. 
Though there is no uniformity in the 
understanding of what a developing countryis, 
and countries which are categorized under 
this title have some common features and 
defining characteristics. A developing country 
may be defined as a country with a low level 
of human development index (HDI), gross 
domestic product (GDP) and industrialization 
(Nordqvist, 2018). A developing country is 
less developed than a developed country. It is 
also known that the economy of developing 
countries is dominated by agriculture. The 
bureaucracy in particular and the governance 
system of developing countries, in general, are 
accused of rampant corruption, human rights 
abuse and absence of transparency. These 
common features put developing countries 
at (almost) similar position during trade 
negotiation, given the fact that the particular 
situation of these states makes a difference. 
Because of their contextual situation, the 
determinants of bargaining power from the side 
of developing countries are similar.  
The Process of Trade Negotiation 
and the Making of Trade Agreements 
Trade negotiation is a pathway to trade 
agreements where the parties on both sides 
of the agreement are bound by the terms 
and conditions thereof. The outcome of trade 
negotiation is a binding instrument called 
agreement, convention or treaty regarding 
that specific aspect of trade. By entering into 
an enforceable trade agreement, a country 
imposes on itself an obligation most probably 
with the expectation of some benefits from 
other contracting countries. Under Article 2(1) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a treaty is defined as “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever 
its particular designation.” It must be noted that 
the free consent of the contracting countries is 
always at the center of any agreement, including 
trade agreements. Regarding the making of a 
treaty, article 1(1) of the 1969 Convention reads:
“The consent of a State to be bound by 
a treaty is expressed by the signature of its 
representative when: (a) the treaty provides 
that signature shall have that effect; (b) it is 
otherwise established that the negotiating States 
were agreed that signature should have that 
effect; or (c) the intention of the State to give 
that effect to the signature appears from the full 
powers of its representative or was expressed 
during the negotiation.”
Treaties will acquire their binding status 
pursuant to the provisions of the agreement 
itself and in accordance with the domestic 
(constitutional) law of negotiating countries. 
A trade agreement is thus an international 
legal instrument born out of negotiation on 
a specific aspect, i.e., goods or services or 
the facilitating environment, between the 
countries that are parties to the agreement. In 
other words, it is the negotiation process that 
gives content and shapes terms and conditions 
of the agreement. In order to be the winner, 
or at least not to be a loser, in such a tough 
process of trade negotiations,  countries across 
the world have developed many principles, 
strategies or approaches that are of significance 
to developing countries. Some of which are 
discussed hereunder in this section. 
Informed Decision Making: there is a 
common maxim – ‘information is power.’ 
Yes, information is power. When a country 
negotiates and entered into a certain trade 
agreement, it makes a decision. To exploit the 
maximum possible advantage from the existing 
condition, the negotiating state shall be well 
aware of that.  The outcome of any bargaining 
game depends on wherefrom negotiations start. 
Trade agreements are no exception. The policies 
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that each country will adopt if no agreement is 
reached provide a reference point - or a ‘threat 
point’ - for the negotiations (Sampson, 2016). 
Countries will make concessions starting from 
this reference point. In such a manner, the final 
outcome depends on the initial point, i.e., the 
existing condition. For most trade negotiations, 
the reference point is the status quo. The 
reference point for negotiations determines 
what countries bargain over and, consequently, 
the outcome of negotiations.   
The Principle of Reciprocity: the main 
purpose of trade agreements is to make all the 
contracting countries better off by preventing 
governments from adopting policies, such as 
import tariffs or foreign investment subsidies, 
which benefit their own economy only because 
they hurt other countries (ibid). Sampson 
(2016) argued that “the potential gains from 
trade agreements are larger when countries 
are willing to make bigger concessions and 
give up more policy control”. The more a 
country makes itself ready to give, the more it 
will be positioned to take from others. Trade 
negotiation should therefore follow a give-and-
take approach or a win-win approach. 
In the current interdependent world, no 
single country is fully self-sufficient to whatever 
degree it advances economically, politically and 
technologically. It should not be forgotten that 
the effects of the trade policy of a country are 
not limited to its national borders. Sampson 
(2016) further stated “in the language of 
economics, trade policy generates international 
‘externalities;` and frequently these externalities 
lead to ‘beggar-my-neighbor’ effects, which 
make other countries worse off.”
Trade policy externalities operate through 
three main channels. First, there are terms 
of trade effects. Each country can use trade 
policy to improve its terms of trade by raising 
the price of its exports relative to its imports. 
For example, OPEC countries improve their 
terms of trade by restricting the supply of oil 
to drive up its price. But one country’s exports 
are another country’s imports. Consequently, a 
country can only improve its terms of trade by 
making imports relatively more expensive for 
the rest of the world. A high oil price benefits 
oil exporters, but hurts oil importers.  
Second, there are production location effects. 
Countries compete to attract investment from 
internationally mobile firms. Policies designed 
to attract foreign investment include reducing 
tariffs on intermediate inputs and providing 
production subsidies through tax breaks or loan 
guarantees. Ireland has been very successful 
in using investment incentives to attract 
multinational firms. But while Ireland benefits 
from increased investment and employment 
and from obtaining access to new technologies, 
other countries lose out. Location decisions are 
a ‘zero-sum game’.
Third, even when firms are immobile, trade 
policy can be used to raise profits of domestic 
firms at the expense of their foreign competitors. 
This profit-shifting effect lies at the heart of the 
decade’s long battle between the United States 
and the EU to capture a greater share of aircraft 
industry profits by subsidizing Boeing and 
Airbus, respectively (Sampson, 2016).
Taking into consideration of  these 
externalities, when a country sets its trade 
policy unilaterally, it must assure the policy 
would  not affect other trading partners. This 
behavior of controlling externalities would 
entitle the country with a privilege to claim more 
concessions.  Put another way, unilateral trade 
policy is beneficial only if the other countries 
do not respond by changing their policies. 
In trade wars, everyone loses. This is why 
trade agreements are needed. By negotiating 
trade agreements, countries can internalize 
externalities resulting from international 
interdependencies, avoid damaging trade wars 
and in a way make all countries better off (ibid). 
That is the foundation for sustainable trade deal 
which in turn maximizes benefits for both the 
parties. 
23
T h e  M a i n  D e t e r m i n a n t s 
of Bargaining Power in Trade 
Negotiation: Developing Countries 
in Focus
The issue of bargaining power arose most 
often in negotiations between developed and 
developing countries. Drahos (2003) illustrates 
that “it is even presumed that, when a developing 
country negotiates with a large developed 
country it generally faces the problem of 
unequal bargaining power.” Trade negotiation 
is very sensitive and highly influenced by the 
bargaining strength of the negotiating countries. 
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), 
an organ mandated for assisting developing 
countries in trade negotiation, was set up by the 
Doha Declaration, which in turn assigned it to 
create subsidiary negotiating bodies to handle 
individual negotiating subjects.  In particular, 
the mandate of the TNC is indicated as quoted 
from WTO (2001): 
“The overall conduct of the negotiations 
shall be supervised by a Trade Negotiations 
Committee under the authority of the General 
Council. The Trade Negotiations Committee 
shall hold its first meeting not later than 
31 January 2002. It shall establish appropriate 
negotiating mechanisms as required and 
supervise the progress of the negotiations.”
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCITAD) has also an initiative 
to improve bargaining power of developing 
countries in trade negotiation. UNICTAD`s 
endeavors  focuses on trade negotiations and 
commercial diplomacy to enhance  policy, 
productive, institutional, regulatory and human 
capacities in developing countries and enable 
them to trade and participate beneficially in the 
international trading system. To achieve this, it 
offers analysis, builds capacity and promotes 
consensus and partnerships on various sectors, 
including trade negotiation. The simple 
implication of all these is how trade negotiation 
is a serious issue where developing countries 
are mostly prone to be jeopardized.   
Under this section, the common indicators 
or factors on the basis of which the level of 
bargaining power of the developing countries 
would be weighed and analyzed are presented 
hereunder.  
According to Grossman (2012), bargaining 
power in the context of trade negotiation has 
three basic sources. Firstly is the market power 
a country has at its command, secondly is the 
state’s ‘commercial intelligence networks’, and 
thirdly is the capacity of a country to control 
others, both state and non-state, in a coalition.
Market Power of a Country
Control over a large domestic market tends 
to give countries a powerful tool in trade 
negotiations (Draho, 2003; Braunstein and 
Epstein, 2002; Karayanidi, 2011). Apparently, 
a country with a relatively large domestic 
market is in a better position, can make 
credible threats and/or promises to countries 
which want access or already depending on 
that specific market. The capacity to make 
such threats is viewed as among the critical 
determinants of a trade negotiation (Draho, 
2003). For example, during the Uruguay 
Round, developing countries had enjoyed the 
benefit of duty-free trading privileges in the US 
under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP). After the US amended its Trade Act 
of 1974 by linking the grant to the provision 
and enforcement of adequate intellectual 
property standards, a number of developing 
countries were threatened with the suspension 
of GSP privileges for failing to enact adequate 
standards of intellectual property protection 
(Drahos, 2003; UNCTAD, 2010)
Commercial Intelligence Networks 
According to Draho (2003), these are networks 
that gather, distribute and analyze information 
relating to a country’s trade, economic and 
business performance as well as those of other 
countries. The more integrated the network 
is the more effective it is likely to be in trade 
negotiations. Developed countries have over 
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time developed sophisticated networks to attain 
such powers (Draho, 2003; Karayanidi, 2011).    
Capacity to Control Others
A third source of bargaining power may be 
the capacity of a country to control other 
countries, both state and non-state, in a coalition 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). Non-state actors 
in the shape of business actors have often been 
crucial in the international trade negotiations. 
The declaration on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
Public in Doha was the product of an alliance 
between developing states and influential NGO 
actors, like the Oxfam and Consumer Project on 
Technology, Médecins Sans Frontières (Draho, 
2003; Drahos & Mayne 2002).
Bargaining power, therefore, may be 
analyzed in two facets. Firstly, the structural 
power of a country, which may be determined 
by the capacity of a country as well as her 
strength in negotiations. In the second facet, 
the procedural power, which  is based on 
bargaining skills, resources and tactics as 
well as the ideational power that depends on 
ideas and norms (Elsig, 2006). The sources 
of bargaining power can be found on these 
different levels, and the discussion of which 
falls hereunder.        
For the purpose of identifying specific 
indicators of bargaining power in trade 
negotiations, establishing taxonomy of facets 
of power in the multilateral trade regime is 
of primary concern. In the same vein, Elsig 
(2006) proposed taxonomy based on structural, 
procedural, ideational as well as institutional 
power as key facets of bargaining power in a 
trade negotiation.  
Structural power
Malik (2013) divided structural power into 
two major elements. The capacities of the 
negotiating party are on the one hand. These 
refer to the neo-realist concept of power; 
indicating that power depends on attributes 
of the country itself, such as economic and 
military capabilities, its population and 
size. Henceforth, the analysis of bargaining 
power in trade negotiations offered in this 
paper lays a focus on the part of economic 
resources and capabilities. It is apparently 
clear that in a negotiation, bargaining power 
depends on what an actor actually has to 
offer. As multilateral trade negotiations are 
about economic concessions, the market size 
and other economic capabilities of each actor 
are important (Elsig, 2006). Considering the 
principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations, 
larger relative market size increases leverage. 
In order to determine economic capabilities, it 
is imperative to establish country’s economic 
profile (Elsig, 2006; Malik, 2013). For a case 
in point, market size merely translates into 
structural power in tariff negotiations if the 
referred market is protected by tariff barriers, 
which can then be used as bargaining chips. 
Accordingly, the prevailing barriers to market 
access which may be used as concessions in the 
negotiations have to be included as well (Bailer, 
2010; Elsig, 2006). Such an economic analysis 
may relatively be sufficient to identify what an 
actor has to offer economically. The positional 
strength is, on the other hand, the second 
element. This is determined by relative losses 
that negotiating countries would have to suffer 
by not concluding the deal (Elsig, 2006). As a 
result, the famous concept of Best Alternative 
to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) arises. 
BATNA is often mentioned as among the 
fundamental elements of bargaining theory 
(Elsig, 2006; Spangler, 2012). The actor in the 
negotiation with the less profitable BATNA 
is more inclined to offer larger concessions 
to conclude the deal. According to Spangler 
(2012), the majority of the developing countries 
have relatively weak BATNA. 
Procedural Power
Procedural power depends on skills as well 
as resources of negotiators (Elsig, 2006). This 
power can be used to offset irregularities in 
structural power and can therefore relatively 
affect the bargaining power of an actor. In 
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technical negotiations, countries with highly 
qualified and experienced negotiators on the 
issues are more likely to be influential. This 
is particularly true for highly technical rules-
based topics such as anti-dumping negotiations 
(ibid). As Odell (2000) points out, the use 
of different tactics may affect the outcome 
of negotiations. A factor that determines 
bargaining power would therefore be the use 
of the relevant tactics in a certain situation 
in negotiations. The effect of a domestic 
ratification constraint on the bargaining power 
of an actor largely depends on tactics within 
the negotiations. A hard bargaining strategy 
can be justified by a weak autonomy of the 
negotiator or a large ratification constraint 
(Karayanidi, 2011). For example, different 
aspects of developing country’s’ foreign and 
trade policy can be interwoven in different fora 
to maximize bargaining power within them. 
Ideational Power 
Ideational power is a result of influences of 
ideas and normative power in multilateral 
trade relations (Orbie & Khorana, 2015). In 
particular terms, literature suggests that these 
ideas, values and norms are important in 
negotiations and multilateral institutions (Elsig, 
2006; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Karayanidi, 
2011; Page, 2002). Three types of norms can be 
distinguished in this course as suggested by 
Finnemore and Sikkink( 1998). Firstly, general 
norms, for example in the case of the European 
Union, include support for democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and good governance. 
Secondly, framework norms which determine 
the underlying approach to market regulation. 
Thirdly, specific norms which are specific 
regulatory provisions defined by a country’s 
laws. Henceforth, by leading the process of 
implementation of norms, a country can exert 
power through its own interpretations of these 
norms. This can therefore serve as an example 
and thus influence behaviour of other actors 
(Woolcock, 2012). Individual countries can 
also cooperate with civil society actors, such 
as NGOs, to increase their ideational power 
(Malik, 2013). Henceforth, ideational power 
can also be used as a tool to determine policy 
problems or solutions in the negotiations. This 
is particularly relevant during the earlier stages 
of multilateral trade negotiations such as the 
agenda-setting phase (Tussie and Saguier, 
2011). 
From this analysis of bargaining power, it is 
apparently clear why the developed countries 
tend to have relatively strong bargaining power 
and developing countries comparatively weak 
bargaining power; true even in a multilateral 
forum like the WTO. This brief review of the 
state of bargaining power implies that much 
remains to be done. Researches so far have 
taken place in the realm of voting power indices, 
which according to Elsig (2006) have failed to 
account for many facets of negotiations. Studies 
that incorporate additional bargaining power 
resources are limited to certain periods and 
measurement challenges.
Furthermore, the bargaining power of 
particularly developing countries is affected 
by the availability of alternatives in the sense 
of availability of options to choose trading 
partners or the fact that the negotiating 
country is not in an urgent need of the deal. 
Secondly, the creditworthiness of the country 
—,that is the past history of the negotiating 
country in the performance of its international 
obligations and commitments – is also an asset 
to attract the confidence of other contracting 
parties. Whether there are concessions or 
gaps in the existing legal framework to 
developing countries is another factor that 
contributes for expanding or lowering down 
bargaining power of the developing countries 
in trade negotiation. Fourthly, the expertise of 
negotiators representing developing countries, 
such as their skill to analyze and differentiate 
the pros and cons of the deal based on 
preliminary survey, to exploit concessions 
and legal gaps, to understand and to be 
understood, and other skills of negotiation play 
significant role to rate the bargaining power of 
the developing countries in trade negotiation. 
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Lastly, the obvious factor that determines such 
bargaining power of countries is its comparative 
advantage which can  be interpreted in terms 
of resource availability – including land and 
human resource, the environment for smooth 
trading – such as legal & policy frameworks, 
the bureaucracy and infrastructure, and market 
access. 
Conclusion 
No country can exclude itself from trade 
cooperation and integration through the 
instrumentality of trade negotiations that 
most often result in binding agreements and 
non-binding memorandum of understandings 
(MOU). However, developed and developing 
countries have not been able to play on 
an equal degree in the process of coming 
together and negotiations. The imbalance of 
bargaining power in trade negotiation between 
developed and developing countries causes 
tilted and unfair trade relation among them. 
Although the factors that negatively affect the 
bargaining power of developing countries in 
trade negotiation generally depend on their 
relative economic strength, political condition, 
infrastructure and resource of the negotiating 
country; some of the factors have been  discussed 
in this paper on the basis of the common feature 
and characteristics of the developing countries. 
Pragmatically, the principles of informed 
decision making and reciprocity are recognized 
as the best trade negotiation strategies that the 
developing countries should be accustomed 
to. There is no concession without a reciprocal 
tradeoff. Parallel to addressing the factors that 
determine their bargaining power (in trade 
negotiation), adoption of these strategies 
is advisable for developing countries to 
improve their position, influencing capacity 
and realize a win-win outcome. As entering 
into a binding trade agreement brings about 
cross-generational consequences, it should 
be conducted thoughtfully and cautiously. 
Moreover, improving the bargaining power 
of developing countries would be an endless 
project so as to equitably utilize world`s 
resources. 
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